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Why WARN? The Impact of Recent 
Plant-Closing and Layoff 
Prenotification Legislation in the 
United States 
Ronald G Ehrenberg and George H. Jakubson 
In July 1988, Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti-fication Act, which requires employers with one hundred or more employees to provide workers, the state government dislocated worker unit, and local 
government officials with sixty days' written advance notice before they shut 
down or make large-scale layoffs. Although legislation calling for advance notice 
had been active in Congress every year since 1979, 1988 represented the first year 
that advance notice legislation passed both houses of Congress, and President 
Reagan, although philosophically opposed to the legislation, bowed to election-
year political pressure and did not veto it. 
WARN went into effect on February 4, 1989. It requires covered employers 
to give sixty days' notice of a plant closing or of a layoff that is planned to last at 
least six months that involves either five hundred or more workers or at least one-
third of the employer's work force. Coverage is not universal, however. In addition 
to not covering small employers, employers are exempted for a number of reasons. 
Employers are exempted, for example, if they are actively seeking ways to avoid 
the shutdown (such as trying to find a buyer for the business), if business circum-
stances that could not be "reasonably foreseen" occur, if a natural disaster directly 
caused the shutdown or mass layoff, if the employer relocated the business within 
a "reasonable" commuting distance of its previous location and offers employees 
jobs at the new location, if the workers to be displaced were hired with the 
understanding that their employment was limited to the duration of a particular 
project, or if a planned layoff of less than sixty days was extended because of 
"unforeseeable" circumstances. In all circumstances, the burden of proof is on 
the employer to demonstrate that an exemption is warranted. 
Penalties for failure to provide the required advance notice include back pay 
and benefits for each displaced worker for each day of violation and a fine of $500 
per day for failing to notify local governments. The determination of whether an 
A substantially shorter version of this paper that contained no references appeared as Ehrenberg 
andJakubson 1990. 
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employer who has failed to provide the required notice is covered by WARN or 
is exempted from the requirement for one of the above reasons is to be made by 
a federal district court only after a suit has been filed by employees, a union, or a 
local government. Unlike other forms of labor market legislation such as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (governing minimum wages, overtime premium, and child 
labor) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the U.S. Department of 
Labor has no enforcement authority under WARN. 
WARN was passed only after a decade of strenuous debate. We can now look 
back and address a number of issues it raised. What benefits did its proponents 
think would arise from the notice legislation, and what costs did its opponents 
think there would be? What public policies toward advance notice do other nations 
have? Did displaced workers in the United States receive advance notice before 
the passage of WARN? What do we know empirically about the effects on workers 
and firms of the provision of advance notice? What has experience under WARN 
taught us? Finally, what research issues need to be addressed to decide if WARN 
is a good idea, and what alternative public policies might help facilitate the 
provision of advance notice to displaced workers? 
Hypothesized Benefits and Costs 
Proponents of advance notice legislation argue that notice provisions ease 
displaced workers' shock and facilitate their search for alternative sources of 
employment or training. Advance notice to government agencies would allow 
them time to mobilize their resources to assist displaced workers. Indeed, a 
companion piece of legislation to WARN, the Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA), specifically required that the U.S. De-
partment of Labor fund programs for states to aid dislocated workers and that 
each state create a state dislocated worker unit (DWU) with the capability of 
responding rapidly to plant closings and large-scale layoffs. 
Advance notice would also allow employers, workers, unions, and local gov-
ernments to work together to see if ways exist to prevent the plant closing or 
layoffs. Options might include wage concessions on the part of workers, tax 
concessions on the part of local government, restructuring of the work environ-
ment to improve productivity, or seeking new ownership, including possibly 
employee ownership. 
To the extent that advance notice facilitates workers' transition to new jobs or 
helps avert worker displacement, proponents argue that it benefits local com-
munities as well as individual workers. Plant shutdowns and massive layoffs place 
extra demands on communities for social services as the stress induced by un-
employment causes an increased incidence of physical and mental ailments. These 
demands arise at the same time local sales and property tax revenue are reduced 
because of the fall in community members' incomes caused by the loss of jobs 
and the decline in property values that would result (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982). 
Opponents of advance notice legislation argued that it would restrict the free 
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mobility of capital and have a number of other adverse effects on firms. They 
argued that it would increase worker turnover and decrease productivity in that 
those productive workers with the best opportunities elsewhere would leave and 
the morale of remaining workers would suffer. They said it would also decrease 
the likelihood that buyers of the plant's product would place new orders, that 
banks would supply new credit, that suppliers would continue to provide services, 
and that the firm could sell the plant to potential buyers. (The latter explains one 
of the exemptions under WARN.) In addition, advance notice might depress 
corporate stock prices. Finally, by effectively increasing the cost of reducing 
employment, it would encourage firms not to expand operations or to substitute 
overtime hours for additional employment (McKersie 1982). 
Critics often stress that the government should encourage firms to provide 
advance notice for workers about to be displaced; what they object to is making 
notice mandatory. Proponents respond that in the absence of mandatory advance 
notice very few displaced workers actually receive such notice; evidence we cite 
below suggests the proponents are probably correct. 
In evaluating the case for advance notice legislation, it is important to stress 
that an employer does not bear the full social cost of the plant shutdown or mass 
layoff for two reasons. On the one hand, because the U.S. unemployment insur-
ance system is financed by an "imperfectly experience-rated" payroll tax, an 
employer's unemployment insurance payroll tax payments will increase by less 
than the unemployment insurance benefits the employer's displaced workers 
receive. On the other hand, an employer typically does not take into account the 
costs that a mass layoff or plant shutdown imposes on the community. 
Proponents of advance notice legislation argue that by implicitly increasing the 
"cost" of plant closings or mass layoffs, employers will be discouraged from taking 
such actions. Critics, of course, stress that anything that implicitly or explicitly 
increases labor costs will encourage the flight of jobs overseas. 
Advance Notice Legislation before WARN 
Most European nations have legislation that calls for advance notice when 
employees are to be laid off. As table 7-1 indicates, when an individual's employ-
ment is terminated, the length of notice required in these countries typically 
depends on whether the individual is a white-collar or a blue-collar employee and 
on his or her length of service with the firm. Typically, in cases when large-scale 
layoffs or plant shutdowns are contemplated, the legislation also calls for advance 
notice to be given to unions and the government and for the employer to negotiate 
with employees and the government over whether the displacement can be 
averted. Often the legislation requires severance pay for displaced workers, and 
some countries, such as Sweden, have detailed programs of labor market services, 
including retraining, job placement, public works jobs, and wage subsidies, to 
facilitate labor market adjustments. In many European countries, establishments 
with fewer than one hundred employees are exempt from advance notice require-
ments, perhaps because the government does not want to add to the costs of small 
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TABLE 7-J. Requirements for Advance Notice for Termination of Employment in 
European Countries, 1989* 
Country 
Austria 
Belgii 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Minimum length of service 
Blue collar 
White collar 
< 2 years 
2-5 years 
5-15 years 
15-25 years 
> 25 years 
Blue collar 
< 6 months 
6 mos.-20 yrs. 
> 20 years 
White collar 
< 5 years 
5-9 years 
> 9 years 
Blue collar 
White collar 
< 6 months 
6 months-2 years 
2 years, 9 months 
months 
5 years, 8 mos.-8 
> 8 years, 7 mont 
6-24 months 
> 24 months 
Blue collar 
White collar 
1 year 
1-4 years 
4—6 years 
6-8 years 
8-10 years 
> 10 years 
13 weeks-2 years 
2-4 years 
5-9 years 
10-14 years 
15 years or more 
9 months 
-5 years, 8 
years, 7 months 
hs 
Employer notice 
2 weeks 
1 month 
2 months 
3 months 
4 months 
5 months 
1 week 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
3 months 
6 months 
6 months plus 3 
months per each 
5 years of 
service over 9 
Set by collective bargaining 
1 month 
3 months 
4 months 
5 months 
6 months 
1 month 
2 months 
Set by collective bargaining 
1 month 
2 months 
3 months 
4 months 
5 months 
5 months plus 1 month 
per year of service 
over 10 up to a 
maximum of 24 months 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
8 weeks 
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TABLE 7-1. (continued) 
Country 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Swedenc 
United Kingdom 
West Germany 
Minimum length of service 
Blue collar 
up to 5 years 
5-10 years 
more than 10 years 
White collar 
up to 5 years 
5-10 years 
more than 10 years 
1-12 months 
1-2 years 
2-5 years 
5 years or more 
All 
< 5 years 
5-9 years 
10 years, age 50 + 
10 years, age 55 + 
10 years, age 60 + 
See note b 
< 1 year 
1-2 years 
> 2 years 
Age 25-29 
Age 30-34 
Age 35-39 
Age 40-44 
Age 45 and over 
1 month-2 years 
2-11 years 
12 or more years 
Blue collar 
all employees 
5-9 years (worked over age 35) 
10-19 years (worked over 
age 35) 
20 yrs. or more (worked 
over age 35) 
Employer notice 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
2 months 
4 months 
6 months 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
1 week + 1 week per 
year of service over age 
21 (to a max. of 13) 
+ 1 week per year of 
service over age 45 (to 
a max. of 13) up to a 
max. of 26 weeks 
1 month 
2 months 
4 months 
5 months 
6 months 
2-3 months 
1 month 
2 months 
3 months 
2 months 
3 months 
4 months 
5 months 
6 months 
1 week 
1 week per year of service 
12 weeks 
2 weeks 
1 month 
2 months 
3 months 
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TABLE 7-1. (continued) 
Country 
West Germany 
Minimum length of service 
White collar 
all employees 
5-8 years (worked over age 25) 
8-10 years (worked over age 25) 
10-12 years (worked over age 25) 
12 years or more (worked 
over age 25) 
Employer notice 
1 month 
3 months 
4 months 
5 months 
6 months 
Source: Authors' interpretation of material in issues of the European Industrial Relations Review between May 
1985 and November 1989. 
aThese notice requirements govern termination of an individual's employment. In some countries additional 
provisions govern notification of unions and governments when collective dismissals are contemplated. 
bNotice required only if two or more workers in companies with fewer than fifty employees or five or more 
workers in companies with more than fifty employees are dismissed. 
cNo statute; typical collective bargaining provision. 
businesses (which typically have high failure rates) or because of the belief that 
shutting down a small business does not have a substantial negative effect on a 
community. 
As table 7-2 indicates, in Canada, both federal and provincial legislation require 
advance notice. The notice required for individual terminations typically depends 
on an individual's prior service with the employer. In cases of anticipated plant 
shutdowns or large-scale layoffs, the length of notice required is longer—typically 
exceeding the sixty-day notice required by WARN. 
Before the passage of WARN, advance notice legislation in the United States 
was much more modest. Debate about such legislation seriously began with the 
deep recession of the mid-1970s. The large number of plant closings and per-
manent layoffs in major manufacturing industries since then increased interest. 
As has often been the case with other forms of government regulation of conditions 
of employment in the United States, action by states preceded federal action. 
As of early 1988, there was no federal law and only a few state laws relating to 
advance notice. Three states—Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii—required advance 
notice of plant shutdowns (with size class exemptions). Maine also required one 
week's severance pay per year of service for workers with more than three years 
of tenure. The penalties for noncompliance were low in Maine ($500 per estab-
lishment) and Wisconsin ($50 per employee) but high in Hawaii (three months' 
wages and benefits per laid-off worker). Connecticut did not require advance 
notice, but did require nonbankrupt firms to maintain health insurance and other 
benefits for up to 120 days for workers unemployed because of plant shutdowns. 
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Michigan all had voluntary programs in which 
firms were urged to provide advance notice and/or to continue benefits. Finally, 
South Carolina "required" employers to give workers two weeks' notice before 
shutting down but only in situations in which employees were required to give 
advance notice before quitting. 
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TABLE 7-2. Notice Requirements for Termination of Employment in Various 
Jurisdictions of Canada, January 1, 1988* 
Jursidiction 
Federal 
Alberta 
British 
Columbia 
Manitoba 
New Brunswick 
Newfoundland 
Nova Scotia 
Ontario 
Prince Edward 
Island 
Quebec 
Individual 
Minimum length of 
service 
3 months 
3 months-2 years 
2 years-4 years 
4 years—6 years 
6 years-8 years 
8 years-10 years 
10 years or more 
6 months-2 years 
^ 3 years 
> 2 weeks 
6 months-5 years 
^ 5 years 
1 month-2 years 
^ 2 years 
3 months-2 years 
2 years-5 years 
5 years-10 years 
^ 1 0 years 
3 months-1 year 
1 year-3 years 
3 years or more 
3 months 
3 months-1 year 
1 year-5 years 
5 years-10 years 
^ 1 0 years 
termination 
Employer notice 
2 weeks 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
5 weeks 
6 weeks 
8 weeks 
2 weeks 
Number of weeks equal 
to years of service to 
maximum of 8 wks. 
1 pay period 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
1 week 
2 weeks 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
1 week 
2 weeks 
No. of weeks equal 
to years of service to a 
max. of 8 weeks 
1 week 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
Mass terminations 
Number of 
employees 
> 5 0 
Employer 
notice 
16 weeks 
No special legislation 
No special legislation 
50-100 
101-300 
>300 
> 2 5 //they 
represent at 
least 25% of 
employer's 
work force 
50-199 
200-499 
>500 
10-99 
100-299 
>300 
50-199 
200-499 
>500 
10 weeks 
14 weeks 
18 weeks 
4 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks 
8 weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks 
No special legislation 
10-99 
100-299 
>300 
8weeks 
12 weeks 
16 weeks 
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TABLE 7-2. (continued) 
Jursidiction 
Saskatchewan 
Northwest 
Territories 
Yukon 
Territory 
Individual 
Minimum length of 
service 
3 months-1 year 
1 year-3 years 
3 years-5 years 
5 years-10 years 
^ 10 years 
No notice 
6 months 
termination 
Employer notice 
1 week 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
8 weeks 
provisions 
1 week 
Mass terminations 
Number of Employer 
employees notice 
No special legislation 
No special legislation 
25-49 4 weeks 
50-99 8 weeks 
100-299 12 weeks 
>300 16 weeks 
Source: Canadian Master Labor Guide, 1989. 
aIn some cases, employee notice of intent to terminate employment is also required. The federal provisions 
apply to federal employees and to employees in regulated industries. Provincial regulations apply to both 
public and private employees with certain exemptions. These exemptions are for both temporary layoffs of 
specified durations and for certain industries. Some laws also require severance pay. Generally, the penalty for 
failure to provide the required notice is payment of the employees' regular wages for the specified period. 
Before WARN, displaced workers in the United States may have received 
advance notice of a pending layoff or plant shutdown if they lived in a state in 
which such notice was required, if a collective bargaining agreement required 
notice, or if an employer voluntarily chose to provide notice. What fraction of 
displaced workers actually received advance notice under these circumstances? 
Three employee-based surveys have recently collected such information. These 
were the Survey of Displaced Workers (SDW), supplements to the January 1984, 
January 1986, and January 1988 Current Population Surveys (CPS), the monthly 
national probability sample of the population from which our unemployment 
and labor force statistics are derived. These supplements covered workers who 
were displaced during the 1979-83, 1981-85, and 1983-87 periods respectively. 
Table 7-3 presents data on the proportion of displaced workers in these surveys 
who received advance notice or expected layoffs. For the purpose of this table, 
displaced workers are defined as persons who permanently lost or involuntarily 
left a full-time wage and salary job in which they had been employed for at least 
three years. These data, presented in the first three rows of the table, suggest that 
more than half the workers displaced during the 1979-87 period did receive 
advance notice or expect their layoff. Thus, at first glance, it may appear that a 
substantial fraction of displaced workers in the United States did receive advance 
notice before WARN. 
One must caution, however, that the question "Did you receive advance notice 
or expect layoff?" does not distinguish between receipt of formal written notice 
and the situation in which a worker simply could "see the handwriting on the 
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TABLE 7-3. Proportion of Displaced Workers Who Received Advance Notice or 
Expected Layoff in the January 1984, January 1986, and January 1988 CPS 
Displaced Worker Supplements 
Received advance notice or expected layoff 
January 1984 Survey (workers displaced in 1979-83) 
January 1986 Survey (workers displaced in 1981-85) 
January 1988 Survey (workers displaced in 1983-87) 
Received written advance notice 
Received written notice of less than one month 
Received written notice of one to two months 
Received written notice of two or more months 
Received written notice but failed to report length 
.56 
.55 
.58 
.20 
.06 
.05 
.07 
.02 
Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1985 and 1987 and tables from a 
forthcoming bulletin covering the 1983-87 period. 
wall" because his or her employer was in trouble. Similarly, it provides no infor-
mation on the length of advance notice that was received; this is a crucial short-
coming in that the effectiveness of advance notice policies in preventing 
displacements and easing displaced workers' transitions back to employment 
presumably depends partially on how far in advance notice is given. 
Fortunately, the January 1988 SDW, which covered workers displaced during 
the 1983-87 period, specifically asked displaced workers if they received formal 
written advance notice. If individuals answered in the affirmative, they were also 
asked whether the notice was less than one month, one month to less than two 
months, or two months or more. The answers to these questions are tabulated in 
the bottom rows of table 7-3. 
Quite strikingly, only 20 percent of these displaced workers reported receiving 
written advance notice. Moreover, most reported receiving written notice of 
relatively short duration. Indeed, only 7 percent of the displaced workers reported 
receiving written notice two or more months before their impending displace-
ment. Hence, before the passage of WARN, only a small fraction of displaced 
workers actually received the sixty days' written advance notice of displacement 
that WARN now requires. Two recent studies of employers who laid off a 
substantial number of workers, one conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the other by the U.S. General Accounting Office, confirm this 
conclusion (see Addison 1991). 
Does Providing Advance Notice Matter? 
Studies of the effects of legally mandated, collectively bargained, or voluntarily 
provided advance notice before the passage of WARN have been of two types. 
The first type looked at the effects of advance notice on employment-related 
variables at the national or community level. One study that used aggregate data 
from twenty-three countries over the 1956—84 period found weak evidence that 
advance notice requirements increase the fraction of the population that is em-
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ployed but decrease their average weekly hours (Lazear 1987). The author attrib-
uted these findings to the fact that many nations with advance notice laws exempt 
part-time employees and thus encourage employers to substitute part-time for 
full-time employees. 
WARN was in fact designed to reduce the possibility of such substitution. 
Although part-time employees who work fewer than twenty hours a week are not 
counted under WARN in determining whether a firm has at least one hundred 
employees and thus is required to give advance notice of displacement, part-time 
employees who are displaced from covered firms are required to receive notice 
under WARN. 
Another study examined the effects of plant closings in Maine in a period before 
the enactment of that state's law. It found that voluntary provision by a firm of 
at least one month's advance notice to its displaced workers significantly reduced 
the impact of the closing on the local area's unemployment rate in the month of 
the closing (Folbre, Leigh ton, and Roderick 1984). While this result may be due 
to more rapid reemployment of displaced workers in the presence of advance 
notice, the authors also found that advance notice was associated with a significant 
reduction in the size of the local labor force in the month of the closing. This 
latter result may reflect either labor force withdrawal or outmigration (and possibly 
reemployment elsewhere); they were unable to ascertain which had occurred. 
The second, and by far more numerous, type of studies examine the effects of 
advance notice on individual displaced workers. For example, one early study of 
thirty-two plant closings in the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
found that voluntarily provided advance notice rarely led to increased quit rates 
or decreased productivity by workers (Weber and Taylor 1963). 
More recently, numerous authors, including ourselves, have drawn inferences 
about the empirical effects of advance notice from analyses of the January 1984 
and January 1986 SDWdata (Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988, 1989; Addison and 
Portugal 1986, 1987a, 1987b; Howland 1988; Podgursky and Swaim 1987a, 
1987b; Swaim and Podgursky 1990). On balance, these studies suggest that the 
provision of advance notice significantly increases the likelihood that a displaced 
worker will not experience any unemployment. That is, advance notice does 
provide time for some soon-to-be-displaced workers to find new jobs before their 
date of displacement. But, in contrast, these studies also suggest that once an 
individual experiences any unemployment, the presence of advance notice has no 
effect on his or her ultimate duration of unemployment. Thus, advance notice 
seems to help only if individuals can find employment before being displaced. 
Moreover, receipt of advance notice appears, for the most part, to have no 
effect on subsequent earnings once a displaced worker is reemployed. Finally, 
among the people in the SDW who received advance notice, there was no evidence 
that a firm's most productive workers were more likely to quit before the displace-
ment date, thereby disrupting the firm's operations in its final weeks. 
All of these conclusions were based on analyses of the 1984 and 1986 SDW 
data in which respondents were asked if they "received advance notice or expected 
layoff." Data from the January 1988 SDW, summarized*in table 7-3, suggest 
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that most people who responded affirmatively probably did not receive formal 
written notice and that those who did primarily received notice of relatively short 
duration. Recent analyses of the 1988 SDW data suggest that formal written 
notice increases the likelihood that an individual will experience no spell of 
unemployment but that the magnitude of the effect of advance notice is smaller 
than when the broader definition of notice found in the 1984 and 1986 studies 
was used (Ruhm 1989; Addison and Portugal 1989). Moreover, written notice 
of at least sixty days lowered the probability of experiencing unemployment by a 
greater amount than written notice of a shorter duration (Nord and Ting 1991). 
Together, these studies suggest that written advance notice per se does not 
determine a worker's success at finding reemployment after displacement but 
rather whether, based on the worker's general perceptions of the likely future of 
the employer, the worker has made efforts to search for new employment. Written 
advance notice will matter only if it substantially provides new information to the 
worker on his or her future employment prospects and only if it is of sufficiently 
long length to give the worker time to conduct a serious job search before being 
displaced. 
Early Experiences under WARN 
WARN has only recently come into effect and it is too early to do a formal 
evaluation of the law. Conversations with U.S. Department of Labor personnel 
and staff at the state DWUs in a number of states, however, provide several 
insights into how it is faring. First, compliance with WARN appears to be high. 
Unlike many other protective labor laws, enforcement of WARN takes place 
through suits filed in individual federal district courts, not through an office in 
the U.S. Department of Labor. As such, there is no central receiver of complaints 
of noncompliance and one has to search hard to obtain evidence. State DWUs, 
as well as the U.S. Department of Labor, receive numerous inquiries from unions 
and employees who feel they should have received advance notice, but often it 
appears that the employers were not required to file because the establishment 
was small or the size of the layoff exempted them from the law. 
Indeed, WARN appears to be providing numerous employment opportunities 
for lawyers, who often appear to be advising their employer-clients to behave 
conservatively. As a result, even employers who are not legally required to provide 
advance notice are often doing so. For example, of the 167 advance notifications 
received by Pennsylvania's DWU from the time of WARN's enactment though 
January 9, 1990, only 117 were from employers who were legally required to 
provide notice. Put another way, about 30 percent of the notifications received 
were not required under the law. (This pattern was not observed, however, in at 
least one of the other states contacted.) 
Why would employers who did not have to comply with WARN do so? One 
possibility is that the debate over the passage of the law raised their consciousness 
of what a "good employer" is. A second possibility is that the law is so complex 
and so ambiguous that they are simply trying to protect themselves. The penalties 
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for noncompliance are so high (up to sixty days' back wages and benefits) that 
many employers may be deciding that it is cheaper to comply than to risk being 
found guilty of a violation. 
As a result, although a number of individuals and unions have indicated to 
state and federal personnel that they intend to file suits for noncompliance, the 
number of suits actually filed appears to be very small. As of early January 1990, 
state DWU personnel in a number of northeastern and midatlantic states knew 
of no lawsuits being filed in their states, and the solicitor's office of the U.S. 
Department of Labor knew of only eight to ten cases in progress. While it is 
possible that the cost of pursuing lawsuits is discouraging complainants from filing 
claims, on balance it appears that compliance with WARN is high. This should 
be contrasted with the relatively high noncompliance rates for the minimum wage 
and overtime pay premium provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, even 
though the penalties for noncompliance and the likelihood of being identified as 
a noncomplier are quite low. 
Second, contrary to popular opinion, WARN is not affecting solely or even 
primarily manufacturing employers. For example, statistics from the second half 
of 1989 indicate that only 27 percent of the notifications in Pennsylvania were 
from employers in manufacturing. Similarly, during the same period, less than 
40 percent of the displaced workers covered by notifications in New York State 
came from manufacturing; the majority had been employed in wholesale trade, 
retail trade, finance insurance and real estate, or service sector jobs. While public 
debate over advance notice legislation in the United States was precipitated by 
concern over the declining manufacturing base, WARN affects a much larger 
range of industries. 
Third, WARN per se does not affect a substantial share of permanently laid-
off workers in the United States. During the February 1, 1989, to December 31, 
1989, period, the first eleven months in which WARN was in effect, there were 
127 advance notifications in New York State, involving 22,822 workers. During 
the same period of time there were 657,247 new claims filed for unemployment 
insurance benefits and 490,889 first payments made to unemployment insurance 
recipients in the state. The difference between the number of new claims filed 
and first payments reflects individuals who were determined to be ineligible for 
benefits (i.e., those who were dismissed for cause or quit their jobs rather than 
being laid off) and those laid-off workers who found new jobs within a week. 
Even if we ignore the fact that some workers covered by WARN notifications 
may have found jobs within one week of their displacement (prior studies suggest 
that about 10 percent of them likely would), it is clear that workers involved in 
WARN notifications are only a small fraction of all new unemployment insurance 
recipients in the state. Indeed, during the eleven-month period in question, they 
represented approximately 4.6 percent (22,822/490,889 X 100) of the state's 
new unemployment insurance recipients. Even if half these recipients were on 
temporary layoff waiting to be recalled by their employers, less than 10 percent 
of permanently displaced workers due to layoffs or plant shutdowns in New York 
State received advance notice under WARN. 
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This percentage is low for two reasons. First, as noted above, small firms are 
not covered by the law, and there are numerous exemptions under WARN. 
Second, WARN covers only plant shutdowns and mass layoffs. Unlike the laws 
prevailing in Canada and many European countries, advance notice for layoffs of 
individuals or small numbers of employees is not required under WARN. 
Implications for Future Research and Public Policy 
Empirical studies suggest that advance notice may well facilitate labor market 
adjustments by allowing displaced workers to find employment before their date 
of displacement. Advance notice appears to reduce the probability that displaced 
workers will suffer any spell of unemployment and thus may well moderate 
temporary increases in area unemployment rates. Moreover, virtually all of the 
studies include as receiving "advance notice" notice of very short duration and 
thus the results in these studies may well understate the effects of mandated notice 
of longer duration accompanied by the other supportive services that WARN calls 
for. Nor did the individual- based data used in most of the studies permit analyses 
of whether advance notice of pending displacements lead to actions (e.g., reor-
ganization, wage concessions, employee ownership) that help avert displacements. 
Although opponents of advance notice cite the potential costs of such policies, 
empirical studies have found no evidence that advance notice causes the most 
productive workers to leave the firm or that the productivity of the remaining 
workers suffers. Moreover, save for one study that used aggregate international 
data, no studies have provided systematic empirical evidence on the adverse effects 
of advance notice that opponents have enumerated (Lazear 1987). 
While at first glance this discussion suggests support for WARN, several cau-
tions are in order. First, the effects of voluntary provision of advance notice in 
situations where workers expect impending displacement anyway may be very 
different from the effects of mandated advance notice in situations where the 
impending displacement is completely unexpected by workers. 
All of the research conducted for the United States has used data that predated 
WARN. Future research will need to analyze data from subsequent years' versions 
of the SDW that cover periods when WARN was in effect. Since WARN requires 
advance notice only for large-scale displacements in large firms, researchers will 
have to take care to distinguish the effects of WARN from the effects of being 
displaced as part of a large-scale displacement from a large firm. In addition, to 
estimate adequately the effects of advance notice per se will require researchers to 
try to model what displaced workers' expectations of displacement would have 
been in the absence of advance notice. Put another way, researchers will need to 
estimate whether formal advance notice actually communicates new information 
to workers. 
Second, the observation that the voluntary provision of advance notice appears 
to reduce the probability that a displaced worker will suffer any unemployment 
does not necessarily imply that mandated advance notice will increase employment 
and decrease unemployment rates. Indeed, one can conceive of situations in which 
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displaced workers compete for a fixed number of vacant positions that only a 
fraction of them can obtain. Advance notice gives those workers who receive 
notice an advantage; it increases their probability of finding one of these jobs. If 
the number of vacant positions is truly fixed, however, by necessity the probability 
that workers who failed to receive notice will find jobs would have to go down. 
In this case, the gains to those workers who received notice would come solely at 
the expense of those workers who failed to receive notice. There would be no 
social gains from advance notice in that, on average, it would not influence 
aggregate employment levels and/or unemployment rates. 
Studies that use individual-based data sets, such as the SDW, cannot test for 
the possibility of such displacement effects. The only study of U.S. data that 
addressed this issue did find evidence that voluntary provision of advance notice 
led to smaller temporary increases in area unemployment rates (Folbre, Leighton, 
and Roderick 1984). The one cross-country study of international data, however, 
found no positive effects of mandated advance notice on aggregate employment 
levels and unemployment rates (Lazear 1987). Clearly, more studies that focus 
on the effects of advance notice on area economic outcomes are needed. 
Suppose for a moment that all voluntarily provided advance notice actually 
does is "reshuffle" jobs among displaced workers from those people who fail to 
receive notice to those people who do receive it. In fact, evidence of such reshuf-
fling might strengthen the case for legislation like WARN if the people who 
receive notice voluntarily are the ones least in need of such assistance. For example, 
if before WARN high-wage, unionized workers were more likely to receive notice 
than comparably skilled, lower-wage nonunion workers (which some data suggest 
was the case), implementation of WARN would allow the latter a "better shot" 
at competing with the former for the available jobs when they are displaced. One 
thus might be in favor of WARN because of its potential redistributive effects, 
even if one believes it will have no net effect on aggregate employment or 
unemployment. 
Third, it is important when designing a policy intervention like WARN to be 
clear about the source of public concern. If the major concern is the costs imposed 
on a local community by a plant closing or large-scale layoff, then public policy 
should specifically address this concern. While such a concern may argue for 
advance notice legislation, in this case exemptions from notice requirements 
should be based on the size of the displacement relative to the local labor market 
not on the absolute sizes of the displacement and the employer, as is currently 
done under WARN. In contrast, if the source of the concern is the private costs 
workers suffer from displacement, then requirements for advance notice of indi-
vidual displacements and/or severance pay provisions, similar to those that exist 
in many European countries, might be worth considering. 
Indeed, it is worth reemphasizing that the data presented here suggest that only 
a small proportion of permanently displaced workers in the United States actually 
receive advance notice of their displacement under WARN. The major reason for 
this is that WARN exempts small employers and small-scale or individual layoffs 
at large employers. To the extent that one believes that advance notice is a desirable 
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policy, one might also consider adopting policies that provide incentives for 
employers to provide advance notice voluntarily for exempted employees. For 
example, the federal government could provide incentives to firms to provide 
such notice by funding a share of the unemployment benefits received by notified 
workers and/or by reducing the corporate profit tax rates of firms that voluntarily 
provide advance notice to displaced workers. 
Finally, well-designed research is needed to address more adequately issues 
relating to the macro labor market effects of WARN, including whether advance 
notice of impending displacement helps prevent displacement from occurring, as 
proponents of the legislation often assert. Moreover, since so much of the research 
has focused on the potential benefits of advance notice legislation, subsequent 
studies of WARN might also focus on research issues that have concerned op-
ponents, namely those relating to the potential costs of the legislation. 
